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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH-

BOWEN TRUCKING, INC., DALBO, INC.,
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC., PHILIP W.
MARTIN AND D.E. CASADA CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 14533

vs,
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
FRANK S. WARNER, OLOF E. ZUNDEL, and
JAMES N. KIMBALL, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and DUANE HALL TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original action brought in this Court
to review orders of the Public Service Commission of Utah in
the matter of the application of Defendant, Duane Hall
Trucking, Inc., to acquire the operating authority of B & M
Service, Inc., as evidenced by Contract Carrier Permit No.
511, Case No. 6257.
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
This case was originally heard by the Public
Service Commission of Utah on the 12th day of December, 1974,
and on the 6th day of January, 1975, the Commission issued
Permit No. 557 restricted to service for and on behalf of
Shell Oil Company

(R. 133-134).

On June 13, 1975, 178

days after the decision of the Commission, and 159 days after
expiration of the statutorily required filing date, applicant
filed a Petition for Rehearing.

Protestants (Plaintiffs

herein) filed a reply and applicant and protestants filed other
pleadings.

Ultimately, on the 1st day of August, 1975, the

Commission denied the Petition for lack of jurisdiction
because of the failure of applicant to file said petition
within the time required by 54-7-15 Utah Code Annotated,
1953 (as amended).

On September 9, 1975, 39 days after the

order denying the Petition for Rehearing, applicant filed a
Motion to Reopen, to which Protestants filed a Motion to
Strike and Memorandum in Support Thereof.

Applicant then

filed its Answer to Motion to Strike and Memorandum in
Support of Reopening.

On the 14th day of January, 1976, the

Commission issued its order reopening the case and on the
5th day of February, held a hearing and issued its Report and
Order dated March 3, 1976, granting to Defendant, Duane Hall
Trucking, Inc., Contract Carrier Permit No. 557, unrestricted
as to shipper (R. 218-220).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the Report and Order dated
March 3, 1976, set aside.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 18, 1974, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc.,
filed an application to acquire the operating authority of B

2.

& M Service, Inc., (R. 110-118).

That application was set

for hearing on December 11, 1974. At the time of the
hearing, applicant, counsel for applicant, and counsel for
protestants entered into a stipulation that any authority
which would be issued pursuant to that proceeding would consist of a Contract Carrier Permit limited to service for
and on behalf of Shell Oil Company.

The Commission accepted

that stipulation (R. 5-6). Based upon that stipulation, the
protestants withdrew their opposition to the application.
On January 6, 1975, the Public Service Commission issued its
Report and Order in Case No. 7062, cancelling the authority
previously held by B & M Service, Inc., and granting to Duane
Hall Trucking, Inc., a permit in accordance with the stipulation entered into on the date of the hearing.

That order

became effective January 6, 1975 (R. 134).
On June 13, 1975, 178 days after the effective
date of the Order, applicant filed its Petition for Rehearing (R. 136), protestants filed their reply to the
document entitled, "Additional Ground for Rehearing and
Answer to Reply11 (R. 145). On July 10, 1975, protestants
filed a reply to said document (R. 148), and applicant
filed an additional document entitled:

"Supplemental Infor-

mation, Answering the Reply of Protestants" (R. 150). On
the 1st day of August, 1975, the Commission entered its Order
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denying the Petition for Rehearing, and found that the
Commission was without jurisdiction to grant applicant's
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to 54-7-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) (R. 154).
On September 9, 1975, 39 days after the Commission's Order denying the Petition for Rehearing, and without
taking an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
within thirty days as required by 54-7-16 Utah Code Annotated,
1953 (as amended), applicant filed its Motion to Reopen
(R. 156). On September 17, 1975, Protestants filed their
Motion to Strike the applicantfs Motion to Reopen and Memorandum
in Support Thereof (R. 169), and on October 3, 1975, the applicant filed its Answer to said Motion.

On January 14, 1976,

the Commission issued its Order granting the Motion to
Reopen (R. 184). The Commission based its Order on Rule 60
(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that
said rule is an "escape valve" to prevent inequity.

On

January 5, 1976, the Commission held a hearing and on the
3rd day of March, 1976, issued ics Report and Order granting
the applicant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., Contract Carrier
Permit No. 557, as follows:
11

* i< -k to operate as a contract motor carrier
transporting oil based muds in fluid form, water
and other fluids used in the drilling of oil
wells, and of water, oils and other fluids to be
used or consumed in connection with oil drilling
or producing operations upon privately owned or
controlled property within producing fields or
within areas being prospected by oil drilling

4.

operations, over irregular routes, to and from all
points and places within the State of Utah where
such oil drilling or producing operations are
being carried on. The transportation authorized
is limited to the described commodities transported
in bulk in tank vehicles. * * * " (R. 219).
Subsequent to that order, and on March 9, 1976, Protestants timely filed their Petition for Reconsideration and
Rehearing (R. 223). As of this date, the Commission has not
acted upon that Order.

However, pursuant to 54-7-15, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) protestants petitioned for
Writ of Certiorari on the 29th day of March, 1976.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF JANUARY 6, 1975, WAS
ADMINISTRATIVELY FINAL NINETEEN DAYS AFTER ITS
EFFECTIVE DATE AND ANY ACTION BY THE COMMISSION
SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
The Public Service Commission of Utah issued its
initial decision in this matter on January 6, 1975. The
Order stated that it would become effective on that date.
Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended)
provides:
" * * * No cause of action arising out of any
order or decision of the commission shall accrue
in any court to any corporation or person unless
such corporation or person shall have made application to the commission for a rehearing before
the effective date of such order or decision, or,
if such order or decision becomes effective prior
to twenty days after its date, before twenty days
after the order or decision. * * * " (Emphasis added)
The record demonstrates that in fact no Petition
for Reconsideration was filed before twenty days after the
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Commissions order as required by statute, and in fact, it
was June 13, 1975, approximately five months after the
effective date of the order, that a Petition for Reconsideration was filed.
The Public Service Commission of Utah on the 1st
day of August, 1975, issued its Order denying the Petition
for Rehearing for lack of jurisdiction based upon 54-7-15,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended).

That decision was

correct. Pursuant to 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as
amended), a Petition for Rehearing must be filed before the
effective date of the Commission's order or decision and if
the order or decision becomes effective prior to twenty
days, said petition must be filed before twenty days after
the order or decision.
Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., admits that
no written Petition for Rehearing was filed with
the Commission prior to the petition dated June 13, 1974
(R. 145). However, Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc.,
alleges that it made verbal objections to the Commission
staff on January 28, 1975, and that this verbal complaint
should be treated as a Petition for Rehearing.

The Order of

the Commission was issued on the 6th day of January, 1975,
and became effective on said date.

In order for a Petition

for Rehearing to be considered timely filed, the same must
have been filed with the Commission not later than the 25th
day of January, 1975, which would be the day before twenty

6.

days after the order or decision.

In Barton Truck Line,

Inc. vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et. a L , Case
No. 9841 (Motion to Dismiss granted August 14, 1963),
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had before it the
issue of the timely filing of a Petition for Reconsideration.

Barton did not file its Petition for Reconsideration

prior to twenty days after the effective date of the Order and
the Commission denied the Petition for Reconsideration.

The

Plaintiff, Barton, filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
which was granted and filed its briefs.

Defendants moved to

dismiss the appeal because the Petition for Reconsideration
was not filed within the time frame provided by the statutes.
The Court, without comment, granted the motion to dismiss.
POINT II
DEFENDANT, DUANE HALL TRUCKING, INC., TOTALLY
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OR AVAIL
ITSELF OF THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY STATUTE.
Notwithstanding its failure to timely file a Petition for Reconsideration, Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc.,
had another statutory remedy which it failed to pursue in
that it could have appealed the order denying the Petition for
Rehearing.

Section 54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as

amended) provides:
,f

Within thirty days after the application for a
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is
granted, within thirty days after the rendition
of the decision on rehearing, the applicant or
any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order or decision rendered upon
rehearing may apply to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the
lawfulness of the order or decision, or the order
or decision on the rehearing inquired into and
determined."

7.

Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. , did not
avail itself of this remedy and did not file any Petition
for Writ of Certiorari within thirty days after the order
denying the Petition for Rehearing.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has uniformly
held that failure to avail oneself of statutory remedies will
preclude a party from asserting any further claim.

Recently,

in the case of Provo City vs. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185 (January
7, 1976), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had before
it a case where Plaintiff had failed to pursue its statutory
right of review.

The Supreme Court held:

11

-k * -k \je have carefully considered the contentions of the parties and we can only conclude
that one who is aggrieved with the decision of
the state engineer must comply with the provisions of Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15 in pursuing
a right of review. * * * The right of appeal as
provided for in the statutes above referred to
is the only method provided for by the legislature for a review. We are of the opinion that
Provo City in filing its complaint more than 23
years after the decision of the state engineer
comes too late. * * * "
Also, in the case of George 0. Smith, deceased and
Lila J. Smith, widow, vs. Industrial Commission of the State,
Weyher Construction Company and the State Insurance Fund,
549 P.2d 499 (April 28, 1976), the Court found that failure
to follow statutory remedies precluded plaintiff from asserting any further claim.
The Commission issued its initial order January 6,
1975.

For Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. to satisfy the juris-

8.

dictional requirement of 54-7-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1953
(as amended), it was required to file a petition for reconsideration by January 25, 1975.
requirement.

It did not satisfy this

In accordance with the decisions interpreting

this provision, the order of the Public Service Commission
was then administratively and judicially final.

Defendant

alleges that it did not know of this requirement until approximately January 28, 1975.

Assuming this is the first day that

he became aware of the requirement, it was then approximately
six months until a Petition for Rehearing was filed, which was
denied

August 1, 1975.
On August 6, 1975, the Supreme Court of Utah issued

its decision in Mary A. Murphy vs. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 539 P.2d 367 (1975) clarifying the burden of proof in a
transfer proceeding.

This is the decision that Duane Hall

Trucking, Inc. relies on to support the need to reopen this proceeding.

The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., and his

counsel, Keith Sohm, knew of that decision approximately two
weeks after its issuance (R. 182) well within the time frame
allowed by 54-7-16 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) to
appeal the denial of the Petition for Rehearing.

Duane Hall

Trucking, Inc., and its counsel knew of all the facts alleged
in its subsequent Motion to Reopen by approximately August
20th; still it failed to avail itself of the statutory remedies and waited until after the time for appeal had expired to
attempt to reopen this matter.

Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. and

its counsel completely ignored all statutory requirements and
yet claim in its Motion to Reopen that it was prejudiced by the
initial decision of January 6, 1975.
9.

POINT III
RULE 60 (b)(7) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS
NOT APPLICABLE AND THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND CONTRARY TO FACT AND LAW
WHEN IT REOPENED THIS PROCEEDING.
Notwithstanding its failure to avail itself of its
statutory remedies, on September 9, 1975, 7 months after the
initial decision and 39 days after the denial of the Petition
for Rehearing, applicant filed a Motion to Reopen proceedings.
The applicant took a Shotgun1 type approach and alleged
several reasons, among them Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Commission in granting the Motion to Reopen

stated:
!,

The Commission is persuaded that as a result of
the erroneous assumption on the part of the Commission and all parties concerning the status of
the law regarding transfer of Contract Carrier
Permits an inequity has resulted in the present
proceeding.11
(R. 184).
The Commission went on to state:
"While we are not in favor or (sic) protracted
proceedings before this Commission, particularly
in the case such as this where we have entered our
decision and denied a Petition for Rehearing, we
do believe that Rule 60 (b)(7) was intended as an
"escape valve" to prevent the type of inequity
which would result were we to fail to reopen this *
matter and hold a further hearing." (R. 184).
The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. based its
motion to reopen on the decision in the ca^e of Mary A. Murphy
vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et

al., 539 P.2d 367

(1975) which it had knowledge of prior to the expiration
of time for appeal and also on the allegation that the

10

Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., had not received that
for which it had bargained.
The latter allegation was directly refuted by
Defendant's witness, Duane Hall.

When the witness was

questioned as to the value of the permit as restricted, he
testified that it was worth the $40,000.00 he paid for it,
!f

as it stands now, yes."

(R. 88). This demonstrates that

the Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., had received in
the initial order dated January 6, 1975, what he bargained
for and expected.

Where is the inequity?

It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's
application of Rule 60 (b)(7) based upon these circumstances
is not in accord with the judicial decisions applying this
provision.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that Rule 60 (b)

will not substitute for appeal except in very extraordinary
circumstances.

In Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 U.2d 277, 282 P.2d

845 (1955) the Court held that Rule 60 (b)(1) authorizing the
Court to relieve a party from final judgment does not apply
where the notice of appeal regarding Rule 73 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure was not timely filed.

The Court stated

that the appeal was not taken in time, and that failure to do
so is jurisdictional requiring dismissal of appeal.
In Kettner vs. Snow, 13 U.2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962)
this Court found that Rule 60 (b) is not a device to be
used to revive the time for taking required steps in a
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legal proceeding after the statutory time for doing so has
elapsed.

If a party could do so, the rules of procedure

would be rendered ineffectual.
In addition to the Utah cases there are many Federal cases interpreting Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Procedure which rule, in substance, is identical to Rule
60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A case very similar to the present proceeding is
Annat vs. United States, 277 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1960).

In

that case, two land owners were sued in a condemnation
action.
appealed.

Judgment was taken against both and only one
The judgment as to the party that appealed

was reversed and the other party moved to set aside its
judgment based upon Rule 60, much the same as Defendant
Duane Hall, sought to have this matter reopened because of
the decision in Murphy vs. Public Service Commission of
Utah, supra.

The 5th Circuit in sustaining the trial court

found the following:
"Relief under Rule 60 (b) was properly denied.
The judgment, insofar as it affected Mrs. Annat's
rights was not a void judgment, nor is there any
other valid reason justifying relief upon the
judgment. Mrs. Annatfs counsel, as we have already
observed, were fully cognizant of the legal question involved in the adoption by the Court of
Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The ruling of rhe Court
in adopting that map as fixing locations, boundaries, and areas become the law of the case and
since Mrs. Annat did not appeal, 4 t remained the
law of the case so far as she is concerned, even
though as was determined in the Paradise Prairie
Land case, the judgment was erroneous. However,
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it is not void and not subject to being
vacated under Rule 60 (b)(4). The fact
that the judgment was erroneous does not
constitute any other reason justifying relief.
The remedy was by appeal.If
The Court applied the rationale of Ackermann vs. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207, and
stated at 277 F.2d 559:
ff

There Ackermann and his wife, and his cousin,
Max Keilbar, had been defendants in a denaturalization proceeding and judgments were entered
cancelling their citizenship. From this judgment,
Keilbar appealed and, on stipulation of the United
States there was a reversal and the complaint as
to Keilbar was dismissed. The Ackermann1s did
not appeal. Thereafter, the Ackermann1s sought to
vacate the judgment under Rule 60 (b). The District Court denied relief and this Court affirmed.
* * * xhe Supreme Court in affirming said, "'Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal * * * "
His choice was a risk but calculated and deliberate and such as follows a free choice. Petitioner
cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not
to appeal was probably wrong, considering the outcome of the Keilbar Case * * *. There must be an
end to litigation someday, and free, calculated
and deliberate choices are not to be relieved from. f,f
It is obvious from the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States that a subsequent decision in the
Murphy Case may not be a basis to reopen a final judgment or
order under Rule 60 (b). This view is further sustained in
the case of Collins vs. the City of Wichita, Kansas, 254 F.2d
837 (10th Cir. 1958).

This case also involved a condemnation

proceeding where one land owner appealed and others did not.
Those that did not appeal sought to set aside the judgment
based upon Rule 60.

The Court held that:

13.

"Litigation must end sometime, and the fact that a
Court may have made a mistake in the law when
entering judgment, or that there may have been
ajudicial change in the Court!s view of the law
after its entry, does not justify setting it
aside. Sunal vs. Large7~jS2 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct.
15S, 891 L.Ed. 1982, Simmons Co. vs. Grier Bros.
Co. 258 U.S. 82, 42 S.Ct. 146, 66 L.Ed.457;
Elgin National Watch Company vs. Barrett, 5th
Circuit, 213 F. 2d 776; Berryhill vs. United
States 6th circuit, 199 F. 2d 217, United States
vs. Kunz, 2nd Circuit, 163 F. 2d 347?1
(Emphasis added).
In the case of Loucke vs. United States, 21 F.R.D.
305 (1957), the Court considered the question of whether a
change in the law would constitute grounds to reopen under
Rule 60 (b). The Court found:
fl

Moved by the foregoing consideration, the Courts
have ennunciated the dual proposition that Rule 60
(b) (6) is not a substitute for appeal and that
resort to the Rule in order to obtain relief from
a judgment is not justified merely because the
judgment is erroneous or because the decisional
law has been changed by a subsequent ruling.
Ackermann vs. United States, 1950, 340 U.S. 193,
71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207; Elgin National Watch
Company vs. Barrett, 5 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 776;
Berryhill vs. United States, 6 Cir., 1952, 199 F.
2d 217. ,f (Emphasis added)
In addition, in the case of Wagner vs. United States%
316 F. 2d 871 (1963), the 2nd Circuit held that:
f!

[2] The catch-all clause of Rule 60 (b)(6),
authorizing the court to relieve a party from a
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief,"
cannot be read to encompass a claim of error for
which appeal is the proper remedy; such a reading
would emasculate the provisions of Rule 73(a), now
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which strictly limit
the time for appeal and which are reinforced by
the last clause of Rule 77(d). Elgin National
Watch Company vs. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776, 779-780
(5 Cir. 1954).
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It is apparent from the cases cited that a change
in the status of the law will not support a reopening of the
case where available statutory remedies were not pursued.
See also Rinieri vs. News Syndicate Company, 385 F. 2d 818
(2nd Cir. 1967); Lubben vs. Selective Service System Local
Board No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1972) and cases cited therein.
If the Court were to adopt the Commission's view
every contract carrier transfer proceeding prior to August
6, 1975, the date of the Murphy decision, would be subject
to review by the simple expedient of a Motion to Reopen
under Rule 60 (b). It is obvious that such a situation
would be untenable, impractical and a total violation of
present standards of finality.
The Motion to Reopen constituted a stray pleading,
the filing of which was procedurally unauthorized and consideration of the motion by the Commission was without
jurisdictional basis.

The Supreme Court has held that once

it has dismissed an appeal because it has no jurisdiction
after the time for appeal has expired that it is powerless to
reinstate that appeal.
P. 2d 843 (1970).

Holbrook vs. Hodson, 24 U. 2d 120,466

In the instant proceeding the Public Ser-

vice Commission denied the Petition for Rehearing for lack
of jurisdiction and then, contrary to existing statutes and
case law, reopened this proceeding.

This procedure is clearly

contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable
statutes governing the judicial review of administrative proceedings.
15.

CONCLUSION
By Order, dated January 6, 1975, the Public
Service Commission of Utah cancelled the authority held
by B & M Service, Inc., and issued to Duane Hall Trucking,
Inc., pursuant to stipulation, a permit to provide a transportation service for and on behalf of Shell Oil Company.
The Defendant did not petition for rehearing within the
time allowed by statute and when it did file its petition,
seven months after the order, it was denied for lack of
jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Duane Hall, did not attempt to

appeal that order and after the time for appeal had expired,
filed a Motion to Reopen.

The Commission in granting that

Motion acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without basis in
fact or law in reopening the proceeding.

In addition, the

Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expanding
the permit issued to Duane Hall based upon the previously
cancelled authority of B & M Service, Inc.
The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., and his
counsel completely ignored all the statutory requirements
relating to proceedings before the Public Service Commission
of Utah.

They then sought to be relieved of their decision

to ignore the requirements by filing a Motion to Reopen.
The Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without
basis in law or fact in perpetuating and condoning the
complete disregard that the Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking,
Inc., and its counsel have shown for the statutory requirements.

16.

If the decision of the Commission is allowed to stand, it
will completely emasculate the statutes and rules of the
Commission and any application, past, present, or future,
would be subject to the arbitrary and capricious whim of
the Commission.

The statutes were designed to bring pro-

ceedings to an end and the cases have supported that intent,
Failure of this court to set aside the Commission's order
of March 3, 1976, will set a precedent in this state that
allows the Commission to completely ignore the statutes by
which it exists.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
Commission's order of March 3, 1976, be set aside.

Respectfully submitted,

William S. Richards
D. Michael Jorgensen
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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